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THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH AFTER CARE
by
Steve Rose
School of Social Welfare
Suny at Stony Brook

Essential to the development of a positive practice in mental
health after-care is a precise formulation of clients' needs.
Clarity about a statement of needs provides added information
about anticipated obstacles to meeting those needs, both at the
client and systemic levels.
To accomplish this preliminary task,
it becomes necessary to create what we refer to as a "problem
definitional" level of theory.
Problem defining theory mediates
between more global theory, which establishes a larger context
for understanding the broad policy issues and direct implications,* and the articulation of practice theory.
Problem definitional theory is a prerequisite to practice as
it establishes both a direction and a baseline for evaluation of
practice activities.
At a programmatic level, it is necessary to
recognize that all providers of services operate out of one or
another approach to defining clients' needs (= problems) as well
as a structure for delivering services.
Properly construed, a
service agency or organization is simultaneously a social system
of interlocking roles/functions and the embodiment of an ideology
or identifiable thought structure that frames the way the organization perceives social reality.
These often underlying assumptions contour agencies perceptions of clients' existence, and
establish the parameters of the functions they have to perform
vis-a-vis one another (Warren et. al., 1974; Rose, 1972).
The
thought structure of an agency contains the problem definition or
theoretical formulation that underlies all services and clientworker interactions.
The thought structure also provides the
formal and implied rationality for the infrastructure of the organization and for its location within the interorganizational
network at the community level.
As Warren and his co-authors
state, the institutionalized thought structure constitutes,
a common frame of reference regarding the nature of social reality, of American society, of social problems,
and of efforts at social change and human betterment.
(Warren, et. al., 1974, p. 19)
*For an elaboration of this approach, see Vicente Navarro,
"Health and the Corporate Societies," Social Policy, Jan/Feb.
1975.
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The thought structure or set of operating assumptions wrn±Ll
typically characterize the commonly found health and social service agencies in most American communities is widespread: its
hidden, but practiced beliefs assert the basic soundness and
equity of U.S. society, its institutions, and patterns of behavior.
The concealed social validation for our political economy and social structure is found in the overwhelming commonality
in the way agencies define the needs/problems of their clients.
Whether the client's assumed
defect was in intellect, personality, discipline, values, family structure or neighborhood, one or
more of these factors were taken to be the determinants of the
client's social position in society.
Agency responses, in the
form of programs and service designs, for example, are often incapable of recognizing poverty as an inherent structural characteristic of our society; incapable of recognizing race, sex, age,
or handicap as structurally and historically determined aspects
or characteristics of American society.
Problem definitional
assumptions, validating inequity and/or discrimination, find
their expression in paradigms of practice which carry with them
practice technologies and assessment methods that turn out to be
self-serving.
They are incapable of critical reflection beyond
the parameters of clients' defects.
Rose's earlier research on
the Community Action Program identified the same phenomena: in
this case, agencies directed to engage in social change defined
services delivered instead a common litany of individual defect
modelled, and residual services (Rose, 1972).
The scope of commonality in problem definition across different types of agencies, operating in different service domains,
in different cities was so typical that Warren et. al. referred
to the pattern as an "institutionalized thought structure."
(Warren et. al., 1974, p. 19).
While agencies as different in
their areas of special interest as the public schools, the urban
renewal agency, the antipoverty program, the major mental health
planning agency, and the health and welfare council were present
in most communities, and had allocated various functions and
tasks among them that differed widely, their locus of common
understanding was in their operational paradigms of practice, all
founded upon a set of basic assumptions invalidating their
clients and validating the social system.
(Warren et. al.,
1974).
Upon closer examination, these agencies appeared to have established "legitimate" domains of domination locally, dividing
the turf according to functions and prerogatives, claimed expertise, and professional leadership. What was found to exist was
an informal, yet pooled hegemony over community activity and
decision-making related to service design and delivery, a rather
loosely orchestrated collaboration determined to protect individual agency turf from infringement or criticism.
Agreement among servie providers at the level of basic assumptions about clients, and ultimate responsibility for problems, allows agencies to attribute program failure either to clilent defects ("blaming the victim," as it has become known)
(Ryan, 1971), or to a form of quantitative rationality.
This
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latter dimension manifests itself in continuous demands for more
funds, more staff, more local control over program decisions,
etc.
Funding agencies, from the vertical system or extracommunity (Warren, 1963, Chapter. 8) at the state or federal
levels, most often share the institutionalized thought structure.
In the unfolding of federal and/or state programs, vertical input
rarely relates to problem definitions, especially so long as
During these periods, the nature of critifunding is available.
cism, such as it was, assumed the problems that existed were related to lack of adequate coordination, insufficent comprehensiveness, and/or inappropriate representation on advisory boards,
all examples of what we have referred to as administrative or
management rationality. As fiscal constraint gradually increases, the demand for more effective coordination is joined by
a growing interest in greater program monitoring and improving
accountability mechanisms, introducing some strain between vertical system funding agencies and horizontal or local system providers of service.
When fiscal crisis continues unabated, however, the vertical
system becomes more determined to locate measures of program effectiveness tied to cost containment. This trend has accelerated
Its pronounced mainfestation is
in public mental health care.
reflected in the increase of people whose training is in disciplines and/or professions outside the typical mental health-social
As a result, incoming policy planservice preparatory schools.
ners, program developers and managers, decision-makers have little commitment to the various particular forms of individual defect explanatory paradigms of the prevailing institutionalized
Corresponding to basic values espoused by
thought structure.
State Bureaus of the Budget, or the Office of Management and Budget at the federal level, their focus has been on management by
objectives, fiscal accountability mechanisms, cost containment
and system development.
The "New Breed" of mental health policy makers, however, are
not consciously predisposed against prevailing individual defect
models, since their systems training and management outlook contains no ideological or substantive critique of the structure of
Instead, their professional set of responsibilities
society.
initially leads them to accept local system institutionalized
thought, and, later, to begin to question it on the basis of
Recidivism
cost-effectiveness measures of program outcomes.
rates probably stand as the most critical evidence available,
with lesser variables including average length of stay on inpatient services, altering discharge planning to avoid nursing
home placements, etc.
Because all socially legitimated professional training accepts prevailing ideology uncritically (Berger and Luckmann,
1967), and extends it by posing the functions of the professions
as technical problem solving (Marcuse: 1964 and O'Connor: 1973),
the "new breed" simultaneously struggles to improve services that
are cost-efficient while having no substantively new criteria for
determining what services will either be of value to clients or
This phenomenon - of increasing technical and
cost efficient.
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management systems without precise theoretical focus - creates
the opening for a problem definitional level of theory, a conceptual articulation of needs that offers a new paradigm for service
design, implications for practice and bases for evaluation and
training.
Basic Statement of Needs
A large number of studies have been done over the years which
describe the process of becoming a mental patient in a state psychiatric hospital.
Perhaps the most detailed account, Asylums,
by Erving Goffman (1963), demonstrated the connection between
defining a problem in a particular fashion, in this case, seeing
dysfunctional behavior as a medical entity, and fashioning an
entire social system whose ultimate function is to confirm that
definition and rule out all possible alternatives. An absolute
prerequisite to the smooth operation of any institution is the
process through which its incarcerated participants learn the new
parameters and intestines of the social reality they must accept
in order to survive.
In the mental hospital, patients must come to accept their
situation or "problem" as mental illness, as a disease which they
had somehow acquired which, from that point forward, dictates the
realm of possibilities for them, as interpreted by hospital
staff.
Staff, in turn, must produce mental patients out of people in order for their own professional identities to make sense.
Once the activity of production of the mental patient has occurred, thus validating staff and invalidating patients (by turning them into adaptive, objectified response units), the drama of
ongoing social interaction simply reproduces the inequality,
domination, and manipulation inherently built into practice of
the medical model.
At the center of the process of becoming a mental patient is
"decontextualization," the severing of the patient's subjectivity
from the objective historical context that frames and contours
human social life. Another way of looking at decontextualization
is to see it as removal from social reality.
The reduction to
isolated, asocial existence is bounded not by history, but by a
belief system committed to psychopathology, medical hegemony, and
somatic interventions such as shock treatment, drugs, and pseudomedical examinations.
Decontextualized experiences of daily life
also become saturated with new language, the language of mental
illness, which contains such concepts as symptoms, regression,
decompensation, "acting out," etc.
These are all terms used to
reduce social reality to intrapsychic distortion.
In place of
living one's life, however painfully, one now "functions" more or
less well, and according to a set of rules and standards which
have no bearing on rehabilitation or return to community living,
but rather reflect management priorities decided by staff to be
in patients' best interests.
When examined closely, the behaviors necessary to becoming a
good patient, especially years ago, are behaviors exactly opposite to those needed by a person to survive in the social world
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The good patient is docile, acquiescent,
of community life.
She/he is overwhelmadaptive to commands both overt and subtle.
ingly dependent upon staff, socially naive regarding rights and/
or entitlements, and demoralized or frightened to be him/herself.
After a time, the externally imposed new social order becomes
incorporated subjectively - the problem definition coercively
But in the process, the patient
held out is tacitly accepted.
undergoes an experience of anomie - of an abrupt withdrawal of
norms and forms (universe of meaning) that communicated the exigencies of daily social life as she/he knew it before entering
The experience of such extraction of one's known
the hospital.
Even conventional common sense
universe of meaning is profound.
communicates this to us when an significant threat of social
change is raised in the common assumption that any departure from
Rather than chaos,
the routine represents absolute chaos.
however, the hospital institutes systematic order, and the patient's experience of heightened anomie together with the hospital's rigid definition of reality combine to produce the mental
patient. Any conscious or non-conscious effect at resistance,
whether expressed behaviorally, emotionally or conceptually is
understood to be part of the patient's symptom pattern, and thus
brings about increased treatment responses designed to attain
manageablity or control.
So as one gains the knowledge and skills necessary to survive
in and adapt to the world of the hospital, one loses those same
Seeing oneself as sick,
capabilities for life in the community.
having lost the ability to link subjective experience to objective circumstances, and seeing the necessity to quickly perceive
the expectations of power holders, the mental patient's potential
for independent or interdependent social life in the community is
thoroughly compromised. Patients' social being, or personhood,
is overwhelmed by their patienthood; their active participation
in the consciousness of historical/social reality is overwhelmed
by their passive acquiescence to and acknowledgement of their own
They have been disconnected from ongoing social
invalid state.
existence, almost as if their capacity to engage in the process
of struggling to live meaningfully had been surgically severed.
It is exactly this objective aspect of utter oppression, behaviorally and conceptually, that constitutes what is called
It is a
"chronic disability," or "institutionalization."
prerequisite to understanding practice to comprehend the experience to which people have been subjected, and to see their
histories in the hospitals as a central ingredient in designing
practice activities with them.
The other aspect of daily life that converges to form the
matrix of understanding how to define the problem properly is
It requires that we remember that the
much easier to elaborate.
mental patient, before entering the hospital, during their stay,
a human,
and after their release, is essentially like us In this capacity, so
and,therefore, social historical being.
estranged from them because of hospitalization, they have needs/
Simply put, those needs include:
interests exactly as we do.
adequate, safe, supportive housing; nutritious food; adequate
clothing; varying knowledge of their rights and entitlements to
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benefits and programs; legal protection; and the choice to participate in socially meaningful interaction with others who treat
them with dignity and respect.
Ex-patients need these resources
socially, as a person living in the community, and not psychiatrically, as a patient residing outside the hospital.
As
such, any effort to deliver social resources in a psychiatric
manner constitutes a situation in which the person's needs may be
met, but in a way which contradicts his/her interests.
At this point, a slight departure is necessary to further
articulate the difference between needs and interests as these
terms were used in the preceding paragraph.
Statements of need
are common enough among mental health and social agencies.
What
such statements rarely take into account is that the way in which
they define needs and/or construct services is entirely confined
by their institutionial thought structures.
Where those thought
systems are premised on some assumption of the inherent defectiveness of their patients or clients, then the orientation towards defining needs will be confined to the parameters of their
thought structure.
In practice, this is commonly reflected in
mental health providers' coupling psychiatric focus to community
resources, or psychiatric determination of generic needs such as
those outlined above: Sheltered housing has as its basis not some
form of care for those unable to live independently, but rather
the assurance that psychotropic medical regimens will be followed; Case management, rather than being built on advocacy and/
or empowerment principles designed to guarantee the essential
dignity and benefits needed, instead focuses on ensuring ongoing
connection to mental health clinics and other treatment outlets.
These psychiatrically oriented services, based on continued attribution of and re-inforcement for mental patienthood as an enduring identity, act against the interests of the former patient
because they continue the pattern of enslaved dependence/
hegemony, they disregard the exploitation inevitably built-in to
profit housing arrangements, and they support passive dependence
upon staff where it is not needed, thus manipulating the former
patient into continued subservience.
The interests of former patients are quite different.
They
need the social resources described above delivered in a way
which recognizes their hospital experiences as oppressive and
debilitating, and works with them to increasingly regain their
human vitality and activity in locating what they require.
The
true needs of the ex-patient are, therefore, complex in nature,
reflecting the experience/existence of the ex-patient understood
as a human being, not as a manufactured commodity/mental patient.
Th use of the term "complex" here is intended: the needs interpreted in a way which recognizes the ex-patients' status as members of a class, are infused with the necessity to begin with
material conditions - housing, food, health care, etc. - as a
basis for understanding subjective responses.
Put more simply,
the ex-patient cannot be understood apart from his/her context,
and that the form of self-expression used in any context is a
crystallization of the social relations contained therein.
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The behavior of the "chronic" ex-patient must be seen in two
ways at the same time: it must be understood as a learned survival strategy, as historical baggage that the person brings with
him/her from the hospital; and it must be seen as recapitulating
and reflecting the self-confidence or self-image experience the
person has as a result of the social relations she/he is and has
been involved in over time.
This latter dimension can be elaborated by seeing in the typical behavior patterns of the expatient-the reciprocal functioning of the typical behavior patterns of the mental health professional; one cannot be understood
apart from the other.
When examining the ideological and organizational bases from and in which mental health theory and
practice emerge, the larger context of social control, oppression
and domination of both workers, confined to mental model
paradigms, and their products - the institutionalized expatients-can be seen.
Because the ideology and organizational
environments are similar across states, the conditions for former
patients discharged into communities across the country are quite
similar.
The ex-patients, then, while existing as individuals,
simultaneously are essentially members of a class.
This issue is both complex an d vital, and must be explained
here at greater length.
This will be done by drawing a distinction between what are referred to as essential aspects of former
patients' lives and existential dimensions.
Following the
theoretical distinctions drawn above, the essential component or
tendency in ex-patients' lives are the political and economic
conditions which all endure in common that aggregate them as members of a common class.
These conditions, in addition to the
common base of long term hospitalization and its impact on selfconfidence and self-image, and its effect on how reality is preceived (i.e., incorporation of the medical model), also has other
constant characteristics: placement in profit-organized long term
care facilities of one kind or another (varying by degree of regulation); dependency on third party payments for medical care;
dependency upon continued eligibility and recertification for SSI
or other forms of public assistance; and, most likely, continuation on psychotropic drugs.
In this complex organization-infused
and dominated existence, ex-patients are subjugated, exploited,
and manipulated in common, as members of a class, and the contours of their daily lives are conditioned by these oppressive,
coerced factors.
Because this is so, and uniform, this dimension
can be viewed as essential or political - it contains the objective parameters for subjective expression, and is the focus of
the advocacy component of an advocacy-empowerment design.
This design is based on the assumption that objective, historical conditions contour the parameters of everyday life, and
establish the bases for individual subjective experience and expression.
The conditions exist, therefore, to create a bond
between ex-patients, even the severely disabled, and ourselves.
The bond is forged by acknowledging the essential human quality
that comes from being part of history, from being socially alive,
and, therefore, actually or potentially a creative participant in
shaping the future.
It is in this socially human crucible that
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the enduring and inherent connection is made between political or
essential life and personal or existential life.
Each of these aspects of every person is inextricably woven
into the other, each a tendency without the capacity to lose its
omni-present life.
While both are present, however, they are not
equally active participants in shaping daily life.
Quite obviously, the historical/political dimension - bringing with it an
ongoing political-economy, culture, ideology and social role
structure - plays a pre-eminent role in determining the personal
exigencies experienced by all of us.
Particular patterns of
self-expression, such as those manifested by ex-patients, reflect
the particular forces which dominate existence: self-expression
and personal experience, therefore, emerge as a social relational/political statement about each of us. Where the patterns of
subjective experience and self-expression fully inculcate the
political environment in its existential forms, our behavior
functions to reproduce that environment and our place within it
(mental patient, husband/wife, parent/child, for example).
Where
our form of self-expression is in conflict with the exigencies of
the political environment, we pose a challenge or threat to it.
Such a position requires some form of response from those political contexts invested in domination and control.
The unwritten
rule is that people must both behave appropriately, or according
to the dictates of the social role structures of such a society,
and must perceive reality in such a way that the behaviors they
embody appear natural or normal.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann describe societal response to abandonment of this latter
element, which they call a "conceptual machinery," similar in the
individual to what we have earlier described in organizations as
an "institutional thought structure":
Therapy entails the application of conceptual machinery
to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institutionalized definitions of reality, or,
in other words, to prevent the "inhabitants of a given
universe from "emigrating."
It does this by applying
the legitimating apparatus to individual "cases".
What interests us here, however, is the conceptual
aspect of therapy.
Since therapy must concern itself
with deviations from the "official" definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual machinery to account
for such deviations and to maintain the realities thus
challenged.
This requires a body of knowledge that includes a theory of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and
a conceptual system for the "cure of souls." (Berger and
Luckmann:
1967, pp. 112-113.)
Sharing in the common universe of meaning, as the background for
our own socialization, creates the basis for shared action.
The
particular experience of the ex-patient, in the process of becoming a "mental patient," is an example of the political role oftherapeutic enterprise in personal life.
Institutionalization, combining coercive physical relocation
and rearrangement of thought to comply with a dictated reality,
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extends the therapeutic mode of social control.
mann address this form of internal domination:

Berger and Luck-

Such a conceptual machinery (therapy) permits its
therapeutic application by the appropriate specialists,
and may also be internalized by the individual afflicted
with the deviant condition.
Internalization itself will
have therapeutic efficacy ....
Successful therapy establishes a symmetry between the conceptual machinery
and its subjective appropriation in the individual's
consciousness; it resocializes the deviant into the
objective reality.
(1967:
p. 114)
The behavior patterns of the institutionalized ex-patient reflect
their resocialization into acceptable patterns of thought and
action.
Severed from the knowledge of the objective conditions
of reality, and medicated beyond its emotional impact, the expatient serves the State successfully by assisting to decrease
State budgets; by serving as the conduit for transferring public
funds to the private profit sector; and by being the
"beneficiary" of federal-state funding programs which transfer
power to the federal level.
These characteristics, coupled with the more commonly
acknowledged matters of material need and program responses in
the forms of profit housing and therapeutic activities, become
the objective universe that extends the worst aspects of hospital
life into the community. The pervasive influence of these objective factors reinforces the demoralized self expressed existentially by the ex-patient.
It is exactly this demoralized self,
communicated as mental patient self-expression, that becomes the
focus of treatment by most after-care provider systems.
In the
implementation of programs which, either overtly or subtly, are
founded upon a medical/therapeutic definition of reality, providers reinforce the decontextualization of hospital life.
Taking the mental patient to be the same as the person disassociates mental health and other social service workers from their
responsibility for their own activity. Accountable to both a
profession and to an agency which employs people socialized into
professional roles and thought structures, the workers become as
disconnected from their real activities - consciously understood
and chosen - as are their products, the ex-patients. Where the
absolute confrontation with the material or objective circumstances of daily life is not seen as the basis for subjective
expression, the essential and the existential components of
living are transposed.
In this process of turning reality on its
head, the expressions of self of the ex-patients are presumed to
be the determinants of their objective situation.
The "treatment" strategy accompanying this outlook thus asserts that the
subjectivity of ex-patients, as manifest in their selfexpression, becomes the target for intervention.
Therapy, drugs,
and all rehabilitation programs are premised on this peculiar,
but all too understandable belief. This effort is directed to
reshaping the subjectivity of former patients by improving their
functioning within their existing social roles, thus reaffirming
the very aspects of the person they find most abhorrent.
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The alternative position follows another road entirely.
It
asserts the primacy of reconnection to objective circumstances as
the central problem to be addressed, as an ever-present theme to
be interwoven in every aspect of practice. Rather than conceal
its nature in subjectivism, it demands that ex-patients be understood as social, historical beings.
Validation, a central value
of this position, derives its meaning from the concept of reconnection.
People, not mental patients, exist in history as actual
or potential producers or paticipants in their own lives.
Validation is communicated through the processes of reconnecting
people to their sociality, disconnecting them from their objectstatus as mental patients.
Idiosyncratic or existential differences, while rot denied, are relegated to secondary importance, as commonalities rise to the position of primacy, and essential aspects of daily life that bond people together become
the data base for creating support networks among people.
The task of engaging people as producer/participants in comprehending and acting on their contextual environment differs
dramatically from working to improve individual patient's
functioning, even though both may claim to improve the quality of
life and self-image of the former patient. One way to view the
scope and depth of the difference is to examine the meaning of
being a producer/participant as compared to being a consumer/
attender.
The producer/participant must come to know the active
ingredients which compose her/his social world of immediate influence.
The framework for development of such a view is openended, confined by limits in our practice and by the interaction
of resources available and decisions to act.
It implies a conscious strategy for action, not an acquiescence to dictates.
Since each of us is immersed in social role behaviors and ideology, in varying degrees, we all actively and perhaps consciously
engage in a process of becoming.
It is important to see that we
are not moving either toward some predetermined model of what a
proper adult might be, and thus subject to manipulation, nor are
we posing some rhetorical infinity such as "the liberated person."
In contrast, each of us can come to increase our knowledge
of our historical and immediate context, and with active support,
strategically intercede into it as participants/producers of what
the outcome might be.
While a group of ex-mental patients can
not transform their condition of poverty, knowing that poverty
has much to do with their present situation can produce different
outcomes from seeing their condition as the result of an incurable disease.
More conventionally, service providers would like their
clientele to become more adroit consumers of services.
Consuming
mental health or social services, however adeptly, communicates
an entirely different outcome than engagement in a process of
participation as a producer.
There is a striking parallel
between consumers of services and consumers of commodities: both
are out of control of what they consume; both stand outside the
determinants of the process of production; both act in response
to a definition of their needs outside their conscious control;
and both are passive recipients of the interaction.
Navarro
describes the effect of consumption on identity in the following
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way: consumption, whether of goods or services, is the residue
allocated to workers and non-workers by capitalist production,
from which the workers are removed as a source of power and control.
Being coerced into consumption creates feelings of helplessness, malaise and pessimism.
(Navarro:
1976, p. 114).
Consuming services is a process through which the consumer must take
on the problem definition of the provider, much like the situation described above in relation to in-patient care.
The process
of consuming the service consumes the person: the likelihood of
the consumer transcending the given universe of meaning established by the provider is very little, indeed.
Marcuse captures this activity of service provision and consumption in a
manner which aptly describes the mental health clinic - former
patient relationship:
To the degree to which they correspond to the given reality, thought and behavior express a false consciousness, responding to and contributing to the preservation
of a false order of facts.
(Marcuse:
1964, p. 145).
Marcuse's concern is with the diminishing capacity to develop
critical analyses of society and its impact on peoples' thought
and behavior, a concern which can be applied to mental health
after-care.
In programs where people have been reduced to mental patients, where presentation of self and the essence of a person
are presumed to be the same, both the person involved and the
workers become flattened out.
There is little to no room for
creativity, for development, for change.
The world of the possible becomes reduced to the situation at hand; stasis,
paralysis, and demoralization occur.
In a program which medicalizes poverty, exploitation, domination and abuse, the contrast
between the given and the possible is collapsed or crushed.
When
the range of needs is defined in terms of medicalized interests,
those needs which can be satisfied by this model are merged with
those which cannot, creating a false universe of satisfaction or
a defective or resistant patient.
In this typical pattern, the
concepts of patients and needs are "reduced," according to Marcuse, and these reduced concepts come to govern the analysis of
human reality.
The result is that these ideas convey
a false consciousness - a concreteness isolated from the
conditions which constitute its reality.
In this context, the operational treatment of the concept assumes a
political function.
The individual and his (sic) behavior are analyzed in a therapeutic sense - adjustment
to his (sic) society.
Thought and expression, theory
and practice are to be brought in line with the facts of
his (sic) existence without leaving room for the conceptual critique of these facts.
(Marcuse: 19 64, p. 107).
Consuming mental health after-care services free from a conceptual critique of the objective reality of hospitalization and
of post-hospital conditions is to consume a false reality.
Living that false reality reaffirms the mental patient role, the
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mental health worker role, and the set of institutions which created them. When we ask the question - who benefits? - we can see
that the primary recipients are outside the equation.
They include the profit accumulated by landlords and pharmaceutical industries; the savings sustained by the state governments; and the
comforts extended to the professional hierarchies dominated by
psychiatry.
What, then, is to be done?
What is necessary is a practice
paradigm which combines some a priori understanding of former
patients' hospitalization experience together with a clear formulation of their needs - real, material needs - as residents of
a community.
It must seek to accept what former patients communicate about their lives as statements about their selfexpression and their view of the perception of them held by
powerful others in their past and present environments.
It must
devise ways of reflecting this shared communication back to the
former patients in a critical manner, so that the interaction
neither reinforces the oppressive reality nor reproduces it.
To
formulate such a practice requires a theory of practice consonant
with the broader theory and problem definitional theory presented
above, a practice, for example, based on the work of Paulo Freire
(Freire:
1971).
By applying Freire's "pedagogy" to former mental patients, we can more easily recognize the class nature of
their oppression and develop strategies for change which do not
replace one pattern of hegemony with another.
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